with information on computer components
and continuing with detailed sessions on
the use of specific software like Microsoft
Windows and Word. They also learned how
to perform calculations in Microsoft Excel
and other functions in Microsoft Office programs. With this knowledge, group members
plan to teach other mine victims. Participants
also organized a series of English-language
and computer courses for the children of mine
victims, conducting 16 lessons in English and
14 lessons in basic computer skills for children in four months.

Mine victims of the Terter branch of the Azerbaijan
Mine Victims Association at the computer course.

Further Collaboration
As an offshoot of their initial training
sessions, participants in the Mine Victims’
Association process began collaborating with
journalists, doctors, local politicians and representatives of national demining organizations. Group members expressed a desire to
improve and expand the initiative among
mine victims to provide necessary assistance
on a regular basis. Plans were solidified for
the future activities of the MVA, including
activities in several Terter district villages.
In November 2006, members of the national and international media were invited
to the Terter region to become acquainted
with the work of the IEPF and the Azerbaijan
National Agency for Mine Action. Meetings
with orthopedic representatives of the
International Committee of the Red Cross
were held in December 2006 to better understand the needs of mine victims in the
Terter region. The dialogue resulted in the
recognition of a need for regional specialists
in orthopedics since the nearest facility, in
Baku, is too distant for many mine victims.
In meetings with local political leaders
and executive members, mine victims participated in direct dialogue with the authorities
responsible for addressing the mine problem
in the Terter district and across Azerbaijan.
Authorities noted concerns surrounding the
determination of disability, provision of social and medical assistance and other issues
related to problems facing mine victims.
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A meeting between ANAMA and members of the MVA was held in November
2006 to discuss the successes of the association to date. The sustainability of the MVA
was one of the most pressing issues, including the broader goal of assisting mine victims throughout Azerbaijan.
Mine-victim Entrepreneurs
Many of the participants in the MVA
seminars have started or furthered their
own businesses in the Terter district based
on information and support provided in the
workshops. Three participants—Nizami
Bardary, Khalil Hatamov and Mohammed
Shirinov—are currently involved with seeding activities and one—Nuru Gouliev—
with beekeeping. Most of the mine-victim
entrepreneurs make four to five times their
annual pensions from their salaries.
Despite their injuries, these mine victims
are actively contributing to their local economies—and they are part of a larger trend toward increased personal independence with
vital assistance programs. Beyond providing
valuable services, these entrepreneurs are integrating into society and serving as models
for other mine victims.
Long-term Goals and Enduring
Challenges
Umud Miryzoyev is proud of the accomplishment of the Mine Victims’ Association
for the Terter district of Azerbaijan, but
much remains to be accomplished in assisting mine victims and their families integrate
fully into society.
Miryzoyev says the MVA will help establish more agricultural units in accordance
with mine victims’ business plans, conduct
vocational courses for victims and their family members, and provide new job placements
to further improve socioeconomic status. All
these undertakings will be accomplished “to
support the mine victims as they settle their
most important problems,” he adds.3
Plans are already underway to improve
the repair process on prosthetic appliances,
Miryzoyev says. “Mine victims have to leave
for Baku or Ganja cities, and, of course, they
have some difficulties in doing it,” he says.3
The IEPF is currently preparing information
on how easy repairs can be made without the
need for extensive travel. But all problems
have not been that easy to solve.
Miryzoyev notes that providing assistance to mine victims who must be treated
and rehabilitated abroad is incredibly difficult. The MVA also faces difficulty in
implementing the prepared business plans
for seminar participants. “Great support is
needed to improve the mine victims’ socio-

Seeding field of mine victim Nizami Bardary in Terter.

economic state, to establish their farm units,
to realize individual business plans and to
assign social aid to mine victims in poor living conditions,” he says.3
There is also the problem of addressing
the needs of mine victims in other regions
of the country. Regional branch offices will
soon begin to tackle complex vocational,
medical, juridical and social problems in
other areas of Azerbaijan. The IEPF is looking to expand further to give greater attention to other villages as branch offices of the
Azerbaijan Mine Victims’ Association are
prepared in Aghstafa, Baku and Fizuli.
See Endnotes, Page

While great progress has been made in SEE in implementing Article 5, some states
in the region continue to face great challenges. Seen here is a minefield warning sign
in Croatia.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF KERRY BRINKERT / GICHD

As the 10-year deadline for fulfilling Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention1 is rapidly approaching for the first
States that ratified or acceded to the Convention, each State Party faces the requirement that all known
anti-personnel mines be destroyed. The author examines the progress and challenges that remain in
Southeast Europe regarding Article 5 implementation.
by Kerry Brinkert [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
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hose wanting to solve the problems caused by anti-personnel
mines had high expectations when the Ottawa Convention
was adopted on 18 September 1997. After all, this event occurred little more than 17 months after the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons2 failed to meet expectations in addressing
the problems caused by anti-personnel mines. Indeed, the CCW’s
marginally enhanced restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines
were deemed by the President of the International Committee of the
Red Cross to be “woefully inadequate” and “unlikely to significantly
reduce the level of civilian landmine casualties.” Even the United
Nations Secretary-General criticized the U.N.’s own vehicle for addressing humanitarian concerns associated with conventional weapons when the Secretary General said he was “deeply disappointed” by
the inability of the CCW to produce results.3
Unlike the CCW, the Ottawa Convention met the expectations
of those wanting a comprehensive approach to solving the problems
caused by AP mines. But in meeting one expectation, states of the
world created another. As noted by Croatia’s Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs when the Convention was opened for signature in
December 1997, “We should bear in mind that we have not completed our journey yet. We have merely obtained a tool that will enable us
to reach our final goal.”4

The Expectations and Challenges Ottawa Presents
The journey referred to involves addressing both external and internal expectations. When a state ratifies or accedes to the Convention,
externally, other states expect that state to fulfil the obligations it has
freely accepted. In addition, internally, a state’s population will or
should expect the state to do what is obliged of it to end the suffering
and casualties caused by AP mines. In few other instances are the
internal and external expectations as high and the challenges as great
as they are in Southeast Europe (SEE).5
The expectations in SEE are high because the states of this region
have in recent memory experienced the devastation of armed conflict
in which anti-personnel mines have been used and have remained
as a deadly legacy. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and
Herzegovina remarked in December 1997, all parties to war in that
country supported the Ottawa Convention “because we experienced
what the use of AP mines means and we know that we should do
everything not to allow this to happen again.”6
The challenges, however, are great, not only due to the magnitude
of the problems, but also because fulfilling state responsibilities has
been complicated in SEE. For instance, every state in the region has
recently been in some form of transition in terms of the establishment or re-establishment of state structures or in terms of transition
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made “every effort to identify.”10 This is the defined endpoint and the expectation
for completion created by the States Parties of Southeast Europe when they ratified
or acceded to the Convention.

The Ottawa Convention defines a “mined area” as “an area which
is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of
mines.” Meeting expectations in implementing Article 5 means ensuring with confidence that all such areas ultimately will no longer
be considered dangerous.

from pre- to post-Cold War state structures. Moreover,
some SEE states lack the means to completely fulfil state
responsibilities on their own.
Challenges notwithstanding, every SEE state
has expressed its consent to be bound by the Ottawa
Convention.7 In doing so, each state has created expectations that significant mine-action progress will be made
and that the ultimate desired impact, an end to suffering
and casualties for all people for all time, will eventually
be realised. On 18 September 2007, a decade will have
passed since the Convention was adopted; States Parties
are now on the eve of a judgment day for progress in
meeting these expectations.
In accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, States
Parties ultimately are expected to do three things:
1. Each State Party must “make every effort to
identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which AP mines are known or suspected
to be emplaced.”8
2. Each State Party identifying such areas must
“ensure as soon as possible that all AP mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are
perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by
fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all AP mines contained
therein have been destroyed.”8
3. Each State Party identifying such areas must “destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as
soon as possible but not later than ten years after
the entry into force of this Convention for that
State Party.”9
Hence, the endstate that is expected of States Parties
is nothing more or less than that which is stated in
Article 5. On the one hand, the Article makes no reference to States Parties striving to become “mine free”
or “mine safe” or “impact free”—all of which are terms
that, while in frequent use, are operationally ambiguous, legally undefined and often politically loaded. On
the other hand, the Article is straightforward in indicating that compliance is nothing short of “the destruction
of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control”—mined areas that each State Party would have
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Macedonia: Meeting the Expectation of Completion
Macedonia recently articulated the endpoint for Article 5 implementation
well in its 15 September 2006, Declaration of Completion, which clearly and
unambiguously states, “The Republic of Macedonia declares that it has destroyed all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which AP mines
were known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the
Convention. The Republic of Macedonia declares that it completed this obligation on 15 September 2006.”11
Macedonia also illustrated that in reaching this endpoint, States Parties can
use the common sense that realistically suggests they need not scour every last
square metre of their territory to determine the presence or absence of AP mines.
Common sense also suggests that it is impossible to assure with absolute certainty that every last mine has been located and removed from identified mined
areas. Macedonia demonstrates this good sense by stating in its Declaration of
Completion, “In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered
[after 15 September 2006], the Republic of Macedonia will:
1. Report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under
Article 7 and share such information through any other informal
means such as the Intersessional Work Programme, including the Standing
Committee meetings;
2. Ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and
3. Destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in these mined areas as
a matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to other
States Parties, as appropriate.”11
Of course, common sense also dictates that States Parties must establish a high
degree of confidence that all necessary measures have been taken. Macedonia illustrated its commitment to building such confidence by providing clarity with
respect to the standards being applied and the means of verification and quality
assurance being used. In doing so, Macedonia alluded to the International Mine
Action Standards,12 which outline what can and should be done in mine action
by defining a “demining process” and hence providing guidance to States Parties
in proceeding with tasks such as: identifying mined areas, establishing a national
demining programme, locating and removing/destroying AP mines, and assuring
that a high standard has been achieved in mine clearance and related activities. No
state is obliged to use the IMAS as its set of standards; however, should individual
States Parties wish, they can use the IMAS as guidance in establishing national
standards for operational actions in order to meet expectations in fulfilling their
legal Ottawa Convention obligations.
BiH and Croatia: More Time is Required
While Macedonia was able to fulfil its obligations in a 10-year period, it was
understood when the Convention was adopted that some States Parties may need
more time “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in mined areas under [their] jurisdiction or control.”9 In accordance with Article 5.3 of the
Convention, States Parties may request an extension for a period of up to 10 years.
Indeed, this understanding was made clear by the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1997 when he stated that “we are aiming to comply with the 10year time limit and do not want to consider an extension yet but the reality of our
problem may make this the only solution.”6
BiH and Croatia have indicated that their challenging environment means
they will not reach Article 5 completion in a 10-year period. This, however, does
not represent a failure to meet expectations; claiming such would ignore the legal
provisions in the Convention to request extra time and disregard these States’
considerable efforts to date in proceeding to fulfil their obligations.
Rather, BiH and Croatia are well-placed to claim success in meeting expectations if:
1. They achieve by 2009 “a status of work conducted under a national demining programme that one could reasonably expect after a 10-year period”

Croatia is one of the SEE states that has made
significant progress in implementing Article 5 since
the Convention entered into force. Pictured here
is a scene of a demining operation near Petrinja,
Croatia, taken 18 October 2006.

given the challenging environment in
which they find themselves.
2. It is clear that a detailed plan is in
place to enable each to declare completion in as short a time period as
possible after 2009.13
Being able to claim interim success in
meeting expectations, though, will be no
easy matter. Making decisions on whether
to grant extensions will be a serious affair for
States Parties. As Croatia itself remarked in
September 2006, “the extension possibility
is not there to serve as an excuse to mine-affected States Parties for making every effort
‘to destroy or ensure the destruction of all
AP mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control,’ but as a necessary tool”
… “a vehicle for the full implementation of
the Convention and not a means for getting
around it.”14
“SMART” Strategies for Implementing
Article 5
BiH and Croatia are not only well-poised
to use the extension provision of Article 5 as
a “vehicle for the full implementation of the
Convention,” but they may also be good examples to other States Parties regarding how
to communicate the matter of meeting 10year expectations of progress in implementation. Good work has been done and those
responsible should take pride in their efforts. The task with respect to the extension
request is now to say what has been done, to
explain the impeding circumstances and to
say what will be done.

A template for preparing extension requests has been developed and enhanced by
Canada and is ready for consideration by the
States Parties at their November 2007 meeting.15 Ultimately, though, this is a voluntary
guide and there is nothing stopping States
like BiH and Croatia from proceeding with
the task at hand. In doing so, it is advisable
that States Parties be as “SMART” as possible with their achievements and goals—that
is, specific, measurable, achievable, relevant
and time-bound. They can articulate matters that are specific and relevant to the actual
obligations of the Convention and quantify
matters to the extent possible. In addition, in
communicating what will be done in the future, they can again be specific, measurable
and relevant, but also communicate matters
that are achievable in a time-bound manner.
For a State Party like BiH, its Landmine
Impact Survey report may be a good starting point. After all, the report in part claims
that it “establishes baseline data for measuring progress.”16 Consequently, questions
that naturally may be on the minds of States
Parties evaluating a request for an extension
might be:
• What means have been used to verify
whether there indeed are mined areas
within these suspected hazard areas? In the process of doing so, what
amount of the suspected hazard areas
originally logged has been released
and how much remains?
• Of the areas identified to contain AP
mines, what is the total area in which
Article 5 obligations were fulfilled?
What means were used to fulfil these
obligations and to assure quality?
How many AP mines were destroyed
and how many other explosive remnants of war destroyed?
• How much area and which areas remain in which Article 5 obligations
must still be fulfilled? Of these, which
areas have been and have not yet been
perimeter-marked, monitored and
protected by fencing or other means,
to ensure the effective exclusion of
civilians? What is the estimated date
for destroying or ensuring the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
contained within each area identified
as containing AP mines?
• If area remains in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be
emplaced, what is the basis for the
continuing suspicion and what is the
estimated size of each area? What is
the estimated date for determining
whether mined areas indeed exist in
suspected hazard areas?

Conclusion
Over the past year, the Convention
community has discussed with great interest the Article 5 extension request process.
However, it is important to recall a point
the Convention’s President made at the
Seventh Meeting of the States Parties:17
“Work on an extensions process should not
be seen as an alternative to fulfilling Article
5 obligations.”18That is, the extensions process is all about communicating that interim
expectations have been met. Actually being
in a position to meet Article 5 obligations
means continuing to carry out the important work of survey, land release, detection
and destruction.
Also in this regard, while BiH and
Croatia may require the use of the extensions
request process, the Seventh Meeting of the
States Parties’ Geneva Progress Report19 recorded that Albania has provided details on
national demining plans that are consistent
with fulfilling Article 5 obligations by the
Convention’s 10-year deadline. Therefore,
Albania should soon be able to declare,
as Macedonia has, that it has fulfilled its
Article 5 obligations, and Serbia may be in a
similar position in due course.
See Endnotes, Page
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